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So much was at stake for Italy, its political class and its economy, and for the European Union (EU) and its
member states in the country’s failed referendum on constitutional reform. In the EU, Germany is a particularly
sensitive case. The relations between Germany and Italy are a focal point in Europe. They used to be in an
asymmetric, albeit comforting, equilibrium. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, in his “Ach Europe”, a collection of
essays on the not-so-powerful member states, has captured the German view well: consternation about Italian
administrative and other odds on the one hand, deep admiration for the incredible beauty of the country, its
culture and charm on the other. From the Italian perspective: an honest respect and admiration for the well-
functioning country in the north, but smiling irony about the German way of life, imbued with a certain self-
confidence, not least in football, where a legendary last-minute victory in the 1970 World Cup semi-final was
followed by many more, albeit less dramatic, ones.
There is a very long, rich and chequered history to such perceptions. This history is anything but comfortable.
Traces of the bitter experiences with Germany in World War II are visible in so many areas of the peninsula. And
yet, until very recently, Italians have been unconditional supporters of the European integration project, and the
comforting equilibrium in its relations with Germany appeared firmly entrenched. But the financial crisis ended all
of that. Germany, its government and its prevailing public opinion shared the Urteil of the financial markets about
the state of the two economies. Lo spread, the discrepancy in the interest rates the two countries must pay,
mirrors the existing difference in their economic cultures. Southern profligacy comes at a price, Italians have
been told, too often in what they perceive as humiliating tones. Ruthless austerity destroys our economy and the
social fabric of our society, and cleaves the citizenry of Europe.
In my tiny little village in Chianti, where I have spent the better part of the year for more than two decades, il
professore tedesco is still well-liked. But he has to listen to angry complaints about his country and was
confronted with the whole country’s Schadenfreude after the Volkswagen emissions cheating scandal. During
conferences and other academic encounters, these reproaches are more sophisticated but equally bitter. On
both sides of the Alps a disentanglement of these debates is badly needed but difficult to accomplish.
The present Italian difficulties with the EU reach far back. Giandomenico Majone, the renowned political scientist,
argues on the basis of intense historical research that the asymmetry between Italy and Germany is the outcome
of a much older story that begins with internal divergences within Italy. The gap between the highly developed
North and the agricultural South persisted and deepened after the unification of Italy in the 19th century. This
remained a strain throughout the European integration process, and was not overcome, but was even
aggravated, by the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union in the Treaty of Maastricht. Maurizio Ferrera,
Professor of Political Science at the University of Milan, has recently confirmed and refined these observations.
“Beneath Italy’s malaise,” he submits, “there is a resilient pounding heart. The country still has a wide and robust
industrial base and is the seat of Europe’s second largest manufacturing sector.” And yet, the malaise is deep
and has manifold causes in the malfunctioning of the administration, in the magnitude and costs of the political
machinery, and in many further inefficiencies.
Hans Magnus Enzensberger dealt with Italy a second time in 2011 in his polemic against the bureaucratisation
of the European project. His empathy led him to predict that precisely because of its ability to synthesise chaos
and creativity, Italy would overcome the crisis. This expectation did not materialise, however. Italy’s governance
patterns are in bad shape. There was every reason for Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to initiate institutional
reforms with the aim of putting an end to the anything-but-workable bicameralismo perfetto, to reorganise the
relations between the state and the regions, to put an end to the restless and too-often failed search for the
majority needed to carry through reasonable and badly needed reforms.
But a Si in the referendum would not have been a guarantee for a successful renewal. To cite Ferrera: “To
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(re)gain momentum,” Italy’s big industrial engine “needs today incisive internal maintenance and re-adaptation. 
Above all it needs to be complemented with a much more efficient service sector (which should itself become a
second engine for growth and employment) and to be supported by a more favourable institutional environment
–including a modernised welfare state.  A lot of dirty bathwater must be thrown away, especially in terms of bad
regulations, rent-subsidising protections, clientelistic distributions.”  We can only hope that a success of Renzi’s
referendum institutionally was not an indispensable precondition for this type of take-off.
Be that as it may, rather than rely on the rescue potential of the European Central Bank when lo spread
eventually returns, we should consider the challenges for Italy, the rest of Europe and Germany in particular.
They have become more threatening, but the difference is only one of degree. The patterns of Europe’s crisis
politics have to be re-examined. This means, first of all, dismissing the one-size fits-all strategies and taking the
varieties of European economies and societies into account in the design of cooperative and corrective
measures. It means, by the same token, taking seriously Hayek’s warnings against the pretence of knowledge,
which is inherent in centralized command-and-control responses to the multifaceted problem constellations
within the EU. It furthermore means dismissing the “we-pay-you-obey” conditionality, which in particular
Germany defends so rigorously. Even in times of crisis, EU member states have to respect each other as equals
and to replace the imposition of conditions for assistance by concepts of inter-state justice. And Italy? The
rejection of Renzi’s constitutional reform means that the country should be more aware than ever of the
necessity to use its rich resources and great talents for a shift from political unrest to constructive reforms if it is
to rebuild its autonomy.
This article has previously been published on the Hertie School Research Blog and is republished here with kind
permission by the author. 
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